Abstract: A senior Japanese economist traces the flows of revenue derived from oil and gas exports through the Russian economy. The author examines the use of revenues and investigates their contribution to Russia's state and regional budgets in the form of taxes. After detailing the methodological difficulties encountered in measuring revenue streams statistically, he proceeds to approximate their magnitude through intensive use of input-output table data and budget statistics provided by the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. His investigation of the list of destination countries for Russian oil and petroleum products exports has interesting implications for the study of capital flight from Russia to the West. Journal of Economic Literature, Classification Numbers: F14, H20, Q43. 10 tables, 37 references.
INTRODUCTION
t is difficult to overestimate the significance of revenues derived from Russia's oil and gas exports. They are increasingly important as potential sources of supply to the West, as well as a weighty factor contributing to the strength of the Russian economy. As shown in Table 1 , exports of oil and gas accounted for approximately 40 percent of Russia's total exports during the period 1995-1999 and 50 percent in the years 2000-2001. 2 The table also confirms the pronounced orientation of Russia's oil and gas industry toward exports-nearly half of the oil and one-third of gas and petroleum products produced in Russia are exported. It is thus fairly clear that most revenues generated by the oil and gas industry are derived from exports, considering the low domestic prices of oil and gas and the acute problem of uncollected payments plaguing the fuel and energy sectors (Pinto et al., 2000a (Pinto et al., , 2000b .
The purpose of this paper is to clarify the flows of oil and gas export revenues through the Russian economy, briefly relate how the revenues are used, and consider whether they properly contribute to the state budget. It is, however, quite difficult to statistically measure the magnitude of the flows, due to the relative scarcity of data as well as the complex organizational structure of the industry. For example, Russian regional foreign trade statistics are of little value in allocating oil and gas export earnings among Russia's 89 regions. As shown in Table 2 , roughly 37 percent of fuel and energy exports during the first six months of 2002 were registered as flows emanating from the city of Moscow, even though Moscow produced 1 Professor of Economics, Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Kita-9, Nishi-7, Kita-ku, Sapporo, Japan; email: shin@slav.hokudai.ac.jp. This paper, based on heretofore unpublished research (Tabata, 2001) , was presented at the 34th National Convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, November 24, 2002 . Partial funding for the study was provided by the Ministry of Education and Science in [2001] [2002] in the form of a grant-in-aid for scientific research on Russia's integration into the world economy. The author wishes to thank Masaaki Kuboniwa as well as colleagues of the State Committee on Statistics of the Russian Federation (Goskomstat Rossii) for their valuable comments and information.
2 Throughout this paper, reference to "oil and gas" includes petroleum products.
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none of the oil or gas (only some petroleum products). Russian regional foreign trade statistics appear to be based on locations where producers were registered (i.e., where the companies were headquartered) or where exports cleared customs rather than on locations where oil and gas were physically extracted. 3 Given these circumstances, this paper represents a preliminary attempt to investigate the flows and taxation of oil and gas export revenues, through intensive use of input-output table data and budget statistics reported by the Russian Federation Ministry of Finance. Table 3 , which is based on input-output tables, shows how sales revenues generated by the oil and gas industry have been distributed in the Russian economy. 4 To begin with, the table indicates that gross profits attributed to the oil and gas sector were relatively small, accounting for 11-14 percent of total sales revenues for the period 1995-1999. This was slightly above the average for all industry (10-12 percent) during this same period. ', 2001, p. 107; RSY, 2001, pp. 355-357, 604; Rossiya, 2002, pp. 189, 360; and Tamozhennaya, various years. Second, in contrast, trade and transportation margins were large, as noted earlier in studies by Kuboniwa (2002a Kuboniwa ( , 2002b . For the period 1995-1998, trade and transportation margins accounted for 23-27 percent and 17-20 percent, respectively. 5 This means that the shares of sales revenues generated by the oil and gas industry (altogether, 42-47 percent) were GTK, 2002 and SEP, No. 6, 2002, pp. 245-282. 5 The substantial increase in trade margins and corresponding decrease in transportation margins in 1999 (Table 3) were due to a change in statistical classification. Our interviews with Goskomstat Rossii officials disclosed that in 1999 Gazprom's headquarters began to be classified as an economic unit in the foreign trade sector. In prior years, the headquarters apparently was classified as part of the transportation, administration, and foreign trade sectors. Quite likely as a result of this change, the bulk of transportation margins of the gas industry began to be registered as trade margins of the gas industry. Much to our surprise, Goskomstat Rossii officials related that Gazprom began to submit its annual report to Goskomstat only in 1999. 2000, pp. 10-13, 16-21, 24-29, 38-45; 2002, pp. 8-11, 36-43, 116-119, 146-151, 158-163; Tablitsy, 2001, pp. 8-13, 16-21, 30-37, 94-99, 102-107, 116-123. allocated to the trade and transportation sectors. In addition, Table 3 shows that approximately 44-51 percent of the trade and transportation margins can be traced to export activities, an observation also noted by Kuboniwa (2002a Kuboniwa ( , 2002b . 6 Third, the share of net taxes on products (i.e., indirect taxes) was 9-14 percent in the period 1995-1999; together with other taxes on production (e.g., property taxes), 14-19 percent of the sales revenues generated by the oil and gas industry were levied as taxes, excluding taxes on profits and personal income. These percentages were higher than the average for industry as a whole (5-8 percent and 7-10 percent, respectively).
FLOW OF OIL AND GAS EXPORT AND SALES REVENUES
Data detailing the distribution of natural gas export revenues, obtained by the author from Goskomstat Rossii, are shown in Table 4 . One can ascertain that in the case of gas, trade and transportation margins were significantly large, accounting for ca. 70-90 percent of export revenues. In 1999, 70 percent of the gas export revenues were recorded as trade margins of Gazprom. 7 Both Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate that most oil and gas export revenues are registered in Russian statistics as trade and transportation margins-a finding summarized in Table 5 . The table shows that GDP (or value added) produced in the oil and gas industry, including net taxes on products, accounted for 7-9 percent of Russia's total GDP during the period 1995-1998. On the other hand, trade and transportation margins produced in the oil and gas industry in these years also accounted for 7-9 percent of Russia's GDP. In the years 1999-2000, the GDP created by the oil and gas industry accounted for 10-13 percent, and trade and transportation margins for 10-12 percent. It follows that half of the value added originating in the oil and gas industry was recorded in statistics outside of this production sector. Altogether, 15-17 percent of Russia's GDP during the period 1995-1998 originated in the oil and gas industry. The recent oil price increases raised the industry's share to 20 percent in 1999 and 24 percent in 2000 (Table 5) . Table 6 presents GDP data for the trade and transportation sectors. Recently, the trade sector accounted for 19-27 percent of Russia's GDP, while the transportation and communications sector's share was 8-11 percent. 8 The trade sector's share is comparable to that of industry and remarkably high by international standards. Table 6 also reveals that 20-24 percent of the trade sector's GDP originated in the oil and gas industry in the form of trade margins (during the period 1995-1998). The share rose to 32 percent in 1999 and reached 40 percent in 2000. This means that one of the decisive factors responsible for a significant expansion of Russia's trade sector can be attributed not only to flourishing retail trade activities but also to the trade margins originating in the oil and gas industry. With respect to the transportation and communications sector, the share of oil and gas industry transportation margins in its GDP fluctuated from 23 to 35 percent over the years 1995-1998, decreasing considerably in 1999, due to the aforementioned change in statistical definitions. 9 6 In 1999 this share escalated to 72 percent, probably largely due to the change in statistical classification described above.
7 Note the impact of the change in the statistical classification. 8 These percentages were calculated on the basis of total GDP at market prices, in order to assure comparability with figures in Table 5 . Usually, in the Russian SNA statistics, such as Natsional 'nyye (2001, p. 44) , the share of each sector is calculated against GDP at basic prices. In addition, as noted in notes to Table 6 , the "trade sector" in Russian input-output tables includes some sectors that are shown independently in Russian SNA statistics (cf. Sistema, 2002, pp. 223-224) .
9 Correspondingly, the share of the oil and gas industry in total transportation margins was very high (52-60 percent) in the years 1995-1998.
TAX REVENUES FROM THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
Tax revenues from the oil and gas industry, largely based on data from input-output tables, are presented in Table 7 . Taxes on production and imports in the input-output tables include indirect taxes, such as VAT, excises, import and export duties, as well as other taxes on production such as deductions for the regeneration of the mineral and raw material base (i.e., geology deductions) and property taxes. Not included in the input-output tables are profit taxes from enterprises, personal income taxes, and payments for the use of the subsoil (i.e., royalties) included in natural resource payments. 10 All such taxes on production and imports levied from the oil and gas industry accounted for roughly 20 percent of total budget revenues of the Russian Federation (see second row in Table 7 ). If we add profit taxes and natural resource payments, the taxes from oil and gas industry reached almost 25 percent of total budget revenues in 1999. 11 Table 4 . Distribution of Revenues Generated by Russian Natural Gas Exports, 1995 Exports, -1999 10 Metodologicheskiye (1996, pp. 231-232) states that geology deductions are included in "other taxes on production" in SNA accounts, although they are taxed on the value of realized products. It also declares that royalties are treated as property income in the form of rents; such treatment essentially accords with the 1993 SNA methodology (System, 1993, p. 182) .
11 Gray (1998, p. 67) estimated that in the period 1993-1996 revenues from the oil and gas industry amounted to 15-20 percent of consolidated budget revenues. His estimates included VAT, excises, export duties, geology deductions, profit tax, royalties, property taxes, and some other taxes as well. Note that our estimate of VAT in 1999 in Table 7 excludes revenues levied by the State Customs Committee (GTK). Of special note are VAT revenues on oil and gas exported to CIS countries, which are excluded (see the second section of the Appendix, on "Export Duties").
The largest amount of revenue was obtained in the form of excises. In the period 1998-2001, about 70-80 percent of these excises were forthcoming from gas and the balance from gasoline and crude oil. 12 Table 8 reveals a specific characteristic of excise payments. 13 The 24-29, 38-49; 2002, pp. 36-47, 50-55, 144-155, 158-163; and Tablitsy, 2001, pp. 16-21, 30-41, 102-107, 116-127. 12 Calculated from data sources shown in footnote "d" in Table 7 . Although excises on oil, gas, and gasoline have flowed exclusively to the federal budget, there have always been some differences between consolidated budget revenues (sum of federal and regional budget revenues) and federal budget revenues from these excises, which have been published in the monthly statistical publication Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoye polozheniye Rossii (SEP). In Table 7 we use the consolidated budget data for these excise revenues.
13 Since 2001, the Ministry of Finance has calculated the tax potential of each region in order to determine the amount needed by the fund for the financial support of the region, using tax revenue data by branch. Table 8 was compiled from such data, derived from the website of the Ministry of Finance (the section on relations between federal and regional budgets). bulk of the excises on gas (56.9 billion rubles in 1999) 14 was not paid by the gas industry, but by the transportation sector. On the other hand, excises on crude oil (5.0 billion rubles in 1999; see SEP, 2000, No. 1, p. 147) were mostly paid by the oil industry. This difference was explained by the different organizational structures of the two industries. In the gas industry, transportation companies (subsidiaries of Gazprom) that rent a high-pressure pipeline from the parent company pay excise taxes, 15 whereas in the oil industry the payments are made by oil-extracting enterprises.
Export duties represent another important source of tax revenues from oil and gas. The duties were abolished in 1996 in response to persistent urgings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but resumed in 1999 after the Russian financial crisis and the ensuing depreciation of the ruble. Because volumes of export duties on oil and gas have never been officially (1996, 2000, 2001b, 2002b) . g Sum of federal and regional budget revenues. Sources: Compiled by the author from RSY, 2001, p. 529; Sistema, 2000, pp. 10-13, 24-29; 2002, pp. 8-11, 50-55, 116-119, 158-163; Tablitsy, 2001, pp. 8-13, 16-21, 94-99, 102-107. 14 In order to be comparable with the data in Table 8 , this amount includes only federal budget revenues and excludes those levied by the GTK (SEP, 2000, No. 1, p. 147) . 15 The organizational structure of Gazprom is detailed, for example, in OECD (2002, pp. 107-108). reported, we proceeded to develop a set of estimates presented in Table 7 . 16 As shown in that table, especially for the years 2000 and 2001, their contribution to the state budget grew considerably and approached the level contributed by excises. According to our estimates, for 2000 and 2001, roughly 77 percent of the combined export duties on oil and gas were collected from oil. It is thus evident that the oil industry pays taxes mainly in the form of export duties, while the gas industry settles accounts in the form of excises. This tendency, as noted below, is gaining momentum in 2002.
Contributions of other forms of rent revenues from oil and gas-geology deductions and royalties-seem to be relatively small. However, unlike excises and export duties on oil and gas, which have flowed exclusively into the federal budget, most of these two rent forms have been identified as revenues of regional budgets. 17 Table 9 discloses that regional budgets received approximately 70-80 percent of these two revenue streams in the years 1999-2001. 18 The table also demonstrates that the revenue streams from geology deductions and royalties emanated from a small number of regions, chiefly those producing oil and gas (see (Table 7) were estimated using export data and statutory tax rates, reflecting legal tax obligations and disregarding widely observed tax exemptions and evasions (export duties for 1995 were reported in Sistema, 2000). Although the estimated duties exclude those on petroleum products, they are not entirely meaningless, at least with regard to recent years. For example, it was reported that export duties attributed to the fuel and energy sector amounted to 25 billion rubles in 1999 (Ekonomika i zhizn ', 2000, No. 13, p. 3), whereas the estimate reported in Table 7 is 16.0 billion rubles. 17 Unless otherwise specified, "regional budgets" in this paper refers to consolidated budgets of subjects of the Russian Federation (Russia's 89 regions), including local budgets (budgets of rayons, cities, and villages). 18 In 2001, regional budget revenues from geology deductions decreased significantly (see Appendix). Table 2 ), but also from the Sakha Republic. The share of Tyumen' Oblast with its two autonomous okrugs (AOs), Khanty-Mansiysk and Yamal-Nenets, has been overwhelmingly high. 19 The most significant change in taxation of oil and gas since 1991 occurred in the beginning of 2002, when mineral extraction taxes (severance taxes) were introduced to replace excises on oil, geology deductions, and most royalties. In addition to that change, the new scheme was expected to increase tax revenues from oil and gas by providing more detailed and clarifying specifications, so as to increase the dependence of tax rates on world market prices (especially of oil) and concentrate these rent revenues in the federal budget (see Appendix for details). The effect of this major change on the economy remains to be seen.
SURPLUS FROM OIL AND GAS EXPORTS
The research and interpretations presented in this paper suggest that the trade and transportation sector (and particularly the trade sector) absorbed significant portions of the profits , 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001b, 2001c, 2002b, 2002c. 19 The four regions, except for Sakha, listed in Table 9 (i.e., Khanty-Mansiysk AO, Yamal-Nenets AO, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan) accounted for 76-82 percent of regional budget revenues from geology deductions in 1997-2000. Accordingly, we estimated that geology deductions from oil and gas were as high as 80 percent of the total (see Table 7 ). Sakha's geology deductions are largely a consequence of diamond production. generated by the oil and gas industry in the form of "margins." As shown in Table 6 , the trade sector's gross profits accounted for more than 40 percent of Russia's total in 1998 and 1999, surpassing the sector's share of total GDP (22-27 percent) and convincingly illustrating the concentration of profits in the sector. However, this sector has not contributed to the state budget proportionately. As shown in Table 8 , the share of the "trade and catering" sector in the total tax payment was a mere 9.5 percent in 1998-1999. And more importantly, its share in profit tax payments was only 9.2 percent in 1999. We may thus posit that the oil and gas companies succeeded in evading tax payments by changing their organizational structure and transferring a substantial amount of profits to their subsidiaries in the trade and transportation sectors. It is worth noting that the city of Moscow has been the center of the trade sector, not only due to the concentration of retail trading, but also because of the trade margins of the oil and gas industry. In 1999, 32.2 percent of Moscow's GDP was produced by the trade sector-an amazing share when compared with the corresponding figure of 14.1 percent for Russia as a whole (Regiony, 2001, Vol. 2, pp. 296-297) . While retail trade turnover in Moscow accounted for 32 percent of Russia's total, the GDP of Moscow's trade sector amounted to 37 percent of the country's 1999 total. 20 Kuboniwa (2002a) suggested that the oil and gas sector constituted one of the main conduits of Russia's capital flight to bank accounts and investments in the West and elsewhere. Although we lack conclusive evidence to prove the point, Russian exports to the so-called "tax-haven" countries reveal an interesting fact. As shown in Table 10 , as much as 10-16 percent of Russia's exports of oil and petroleum products have gone to the tax havens since 1995. Moreover, the share of oil and petroleum products in Russia's exports to each such country has often exceeded 90 percent. This means that some of these countries imported only oil and petroleum products from Russia. Although we have not investigated the energy consumption patterns of any of these countries, it is plausible that at least a part of the revenues from Russian exports has remained abroad, contributing to the flight of capital. 21
CONCLUDING NOTE
As this study demonstrates, detailed statistical research, which during the period of Communism was virtually the only tool available to Western students of the Soviet economy, continues to be useful nearly 11 years after the dissolution of the USSR. This study is based on such "Sovietological" methods, although the volume of data now accessible would have exceeded the wildest expectations of any Soviet-era investigator. That being said, in certain parts of the paper, such as those dealing with capital flight and tax evasion, the data remain inconclusive and only suggest directions for future research. It is possible that, given enough time, more information may become available to facilitate a probe of these murky waters. With regard to purely statistical findings, three basic conclusions appear to be warranted. First, it is rather apparent that a considerable portion of revenues derived from oil and gas exports are transferred from the extracting companies to the trade and transportation sectors. These transfers typically are executed by means of trade and transportation margins. Second, the tax burden of enterprises engaged in oil and gas extraction has been heavy and tax 20 Calculated from Regiony (2001, Vol. 2, pp. 293-294, 296-297) . Here, the "trade sector" is defined narrowly, including only trade and catering. 21 In other words, not all of the oil and oil products "imported" by these countries are actually consumed there, but rather are sold to customers in other destinations-Ed, EGE.
schemes have been frequently reformed. Finally, and in contrast to the situation experienced by the extracting enterprises, taxation of profits transferred from the oil and gas industry to the trade sector appears to have been far from adequate.
Payments for the Use of Subsoil (royalties)
Royalty tax rates for oil and gas ranged from 6 to 16 percent of the value of realized products, as specified in Government Decree No. 828 of October 28, 1992. According to this decree, actual rates for each deposit were to be determined by taking into account the quantity and quality of reserves, the physical geographic and mining conditions, and other factors. In reality, the rates were determined by negotiation (Sagers et al., 1995, p. 417) . Article 42 of the Law on the Subsoil stipulated the distribution of royalties among different budgets in the following way: 40 percent was to be allocated to the federal budget, 30 percent to the regional budget, and 30 percent to the local budget.
The introduction of severance taxes in 2002 effected a fundamental change in the role of royalties. Article 39 of the revised version of the Law on the Subsoil, in effect since January 1, 2002, specified five forms of payment for the use of subsoil resources: (1) a one-time payment (bonuses); (2) regular payments (rentals); (3) payments for geological information; (4) fees for participation in auctions; and (5) fees for licenses. Although the specific character of these fees became more complex over time, the total amount or royalties is expected to be considerably smaller than in the past (Pavlova and Kanatayev, 2002; Salina, 2002) .
Mineral Extraction Fees (severance taxes)
So-called "severance taxes" were introduced by Chapter 26 of the Tax Code on January 1, 2002. Tax rates on oil and gas were set at a uniform rate of 16.5 percent of the value of realized products, regardless of the conditions and costs of extraction. However, with regard to oil, a special arrangement will be applied during [2002] [2003] [2004] ; the tax rate initially is to be set at 340 rubles per ton, but adjusted using a formula tied to international market prices (Article 5 of Federal Law No. 126 of August 8, 2001 ). This temporary measure reportedly was enacted because "transfer prices" on oil reduced the tax base for severance taxes (Salina, 2002, p. 44) , in effect transfering profits generated by oil-extracting companies to their subsidiaries in other sectors of the economy, as discussed above.
A lion's share (80 percent) of severance tax revenues from oil and gas is distributed to the federal budget, while the balance (20 percent) is allocated to regional budgets. However, when oil or gas is extracted in an autonomous okrug, 74.5 percent accrues to the federal budget, 5.5 percent to the budget of the kray or oblast in which the okrug is located, and the remaining 20 percent to the okrug budget. 30 These shares suggest a further concentration of rent revenues in the federal budget.
